























King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Nemeth, B. How to bridge the “three islands”: The future of European military co-operation
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
How to bridge the ‘three islands’:
The future of European military co-operation
By Bence Németh
After the 2008 Financial Crisis, many European countries have started to intensify their 
thinking about co-operation in military capability development, particularly with their 
regional partners.1 The rationale behind this closer military co-operation is that Euro-
pean countries want to maintain and develop their military capabilities, but do not want 
to spend highly on defence. Analysts and scholars have drawn attention to the need for 
higher levels of European military co-operation for years. They have argued that in in-
ternational comparisons, the Member States of the European Union spend heavily on 
their militaries but spend poorly, because they do not co-ordinate their military devel-
opment, procurement, training, and so on. This has led to scarcities in certain areas and 
over-capacities in others. However, the willingness for deeper military co-operation has 
become apparent since the financial crisis hit, and the scarcity of money has accelerated 
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different kinds of projects. The most important examples of real military co-operation 
are the following:
• NORDEFCO: While the Nordic countries have a long history of co-operation in 
military affairs, it accelerated after 2008, when Finland, Norway and Sweden inten-
sified their collaboration. One year later all Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden – decided to found one comprehensive structure. 
Known as Nordic Defence Co-operation (NORDEFCO), this covers almost the whole 
spectrum of their military sectors, in order to achieve cost-effectiveness and en-
hanced operational capabilities.
• The British-French alliance: In November 2010, France and the United King-
dom signed two treaties (letters of intent) on co-operation in strategically crucial 
fields. The first treaty between London and Paris is an ‘overarching defence co-
operation treaty’, which introduced initiatives on aircraft carrier collaboration; the 
sharing of training, resources and maintenance; the establishment of a division-size 
joint expeditionary force; and military-industrial co-operation.2 The second treaty, 
which focuses on nuclear collaboration, provides the possibility for the two Euro-
pean nuclear powers to share their nuclear research and testing information with 
one another.
• Central European co-operation: In early 2011, the Directors of Defence Policy 
of six Central European countries – Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia – agreed to begin to map the possible areas of co-operation 
where their countries could pool and share military capabilities, and also agreed to 
coordinate their standpoints on different defence policy and planning issues. They 
have already met several times during 2011 and expert level negotiations have begun 
on certain issues.
Of course, cross border military co-operation in Europe is not a new phenomenon, and 
many multinational frameworks have been initiated over the last two decades (e.g. the 
British-Dutch Amphibious Group; the Franco-German Brigade; the Hungarian-
Romanian Peacekeeping Battalion; Belgian-Dutch naval co-operation; the Baltic De-
fence College; Strategic Airlift Capability; the European Air Transport Command, and 
so on). Importantly, this cross-border co-operation has been mostly one-sided, covering 
only one area; the military co-operation established after the financial crisis, however, is 
– or was intended to be – both multi-dimensional and permanently-structured at one 
and the same time.
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Efforts for deeper military co-operation have started not only in regional and bilateral 
frameworks, but also through the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Independ-
ently from the financial crisis, the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1st De-
cember 2009, provided the opportunity for the creation of ‘Permanent Structured Co-
operation’ for ‘those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and 
which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to 
the most demanding missions.’3 Yet, despite a huge amount of negotiation, the Member 
States have not yet reached consensus on the details surrounding permanent structured 
co-operation. Instead, the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance have recently es-
tablished new mechanisms concerning military capability development, respectively 
‘Pooling and Sharing’ and ‘Smart Defence’, to indicate the same idea, namely, establish-
ing closer co-operation (e.g., the sharing and pooling of capabilities, role sharing, pool-
ing through acquisition, and so on) between certain Member States to sustain or de-
velop more effective military capabilities.
However, the aforenamed regional military co-operation shows that many Member 
States often still prefer to work bilaterally or regionally than through the European Un-
ion and/or the Atlantic Alliance. Of course, this does not mean that they do not co-
operate within these institutions; what is does mean is that there are significant areas 
where increasingly more states consider either the European Union or the Atlantic Alli-
ance inappropriate for multinational military co-operation. For instance, many Nordic 
countries see these two organisations – especially the European Union – as too compli-
cated, large and slow.4 Furthermore, both British and French officials are dissatisfied 
with the progress of the Common Security and Defence Policy with regards to capability 
development, and believe that bilateral military collaboration will work much better 
among ‘natural partners’ than co-operation within multilateral institutions.5 The 
smaller Central European states have realised that they have many similar problems 
and most of the current institutionalised initiatives are not appropriate to solve them, 
thus they need a closer co-operation to find out whether they could solve their common 
problems together.
Although these ‘three islands’ of co-operation – NORDEFCO, the enhanced British-
French alliance and Central European co-operation – are still relatively new, they have 
already provided some important initial lessons.6 These are:
1. Similar needs and problems matter more than institutions
The participating states of the ‘three islands’ co-operate with their regional partners 
irrespectively of whether they are members of the same military-related organisations. 
For instance, with regards to NORDEFCO, Norway and Iceland are members of the At-
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lantic Alliance; Finland and Sweden are Member States of the European Union; and 
Denmark belongs of both organisations, although it opts-out of the Common Security 
and Defence Policy. Concerning Central European co-operation, Austria is a Member 
State of the European Union; Croatia is a member of the Atlantic Alliance (and will join 
the European Union in 2013); while the other four countries are part of both organisa-
tions. So many European countries use only partly the frameworks and mechanisms of 
the Atlantic Alliance and European Union for enhancing their co-operation in capability  
development, and often search for partners on a neighbourly basis. This clearly shows 
the hardship of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance in attracting their mem-
bers to co-operate in their frameworks, and also points to the diverging interests and 
problems of groups of European states concerning military-related issues.
One of the most important reasons for this phenomenon is the capability gaps between 
European states and thus the different needs and possibilities of their armed forces, 
which are hardly solvable in the framework of big, heterogeneous multinational organi-
sations. While for instance France and the United Kingdom have a problem in develop-
ing new aircraft carriers to maintain an appropriate capability to project force overseas,7 
many Central European countries struggle to procure and/or maintain modern fighter 
jets for air policy tasks.8 These different needs could give the opportunity for co-
operation between the smaller Central European states on air policing and between 
France and the United Kingdom on sharing aircraft carriers. However, they also point 
to the phenomenon that capability gap can actually hinder collaboration, and identical 
capability needs can provide a better ground for co-operation than institutional mem-
bership.
2. Coherence between high and low politics is the key driving force
Many analysts have highlighted the importance of the co-operating countries’ similari-
ties regarding their strategic culture, force structure, size and quality of their armed 
forces, equipment, vehicles, and so on. Indeed these elements can make co-operation 
smoother, but – besides the aforementioned similar capability needs – the coherence 
between the intentions of politicians and the military are vital regarding multinational 
capability development. If this coherence does not exist, the co-operation will face per-
sistent difficulties, independently of the co-operating armed forces’ similarities.
Some have already warned that European defence ministries have ‘highly effective 
“immune systems”’ towards new ideas,9 and ‘experts have no sympathy with doing 
things differently.’10 Namely, if politicians agree on co-operation, bureaucracies can still 
slow down the process and provide such analyses that emphasise the difficulties instead 
of solutions. Such fears are apparent, especially concerning British-French co-
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operation, where the heads of state agreed on the collaboration, and then have to press 
the defence establishment to execute the agreed initiatives. In this top-down process, 
the politicians are convinced about the necessity of co-operation but the defence minis-
tries are not necessarily in full agreement with it. However, in regard to NORDEFCO 
and Central European co-operation, the situation is quite the opposite. These cases 
have been bottom-up processes, which were initiated by the respective defence minis-
tries, thus the military establishments in these countries are often more convinced 
about the usefulness of co-operation than high politics. In principle, and in general, 
high politics demands co-operation, but problems can arise when concrete decisions 
have to be taken which may need sacrifices from the participating countries. Accord-
ingly, at times the defence establishment attempts to persuade the politicians that co-
operation on capability development is useful, economically beneficial and inevitable, 
despite the fact that it can lead to more interdependencies.
3. A full spectrum of capabilities will make co-operation more effective
Countries intending to maintain a full spectrum (or near full spectrum) of military ca-
pabilities have a greater chance of successful collaboration than countries that have al-
ready addressed their lack of resources by specialisation and cutting certain military ca-
pabilities. For instance, both France and the United Kingdom are committed to possess 
a full spectrum of armed forces and have found many opportunities for military col-
laboration. In regard to NORDEFCO, Sweden, Norway and Finland boosted Nordic co-
operation in 2008 to solve their lack of resources by co-operation rather than cutting 
complete capacities. But Denmark – like most of the smaller members of the Atlantic 
Alliance – has already abandoned whole capabilities; thus Copenhagen is the least in-
terested in NORDEFCO among the participating states.11 Similarly, many smaller Cen-
tral European countries have concentrated on the development of different niche capa-
bilities – encouraged among others by the Atlantic Alliance – meaning that they have 
also lost many capabilities over the last few years. Now they face hardships to find 
proper areas of co-operation.
The reason for this phenomenon is probability: if countries have a full spectrum of ca-
pabilities, they can choose from a wider range of areas to co-operate. Contrarily, coun-
tries which have already lost many capacities, and focused on niche capabilities and role 
specialisation, have fewer options for co-operation. Understandably, they tend to focus 
only on their remaining capabilities for co-operation, because they got used to – or 
learnt to live without – their lost capabilities. Furthermore, because of political consid-
erations, many capabilities are not always suitable for international co-operation. This 
is less problematic for states maintaining a full spectrum of capabilities because of their 
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greater options, but this narrows further the already fewer possibilities regarding co-
operation for countries which previously cut whole capacities. Accordingly, countries 
focusing on role specialisation and niche capabilities have less chance to fit in with oth-
ers.
4. Previous co-operation helps
Former military co-operation among participating countries can provide a fruitful envi-
ronment for the stimulation of new collaboration on capability development. Indeed, 
new military collaboration can be seen as the natural continuation of former activity 
and this fosters its acceptance by both decision makers and the public. Equally, refer-
ring to former co-operation – particularly when successful – can even provide ‘fire-
power‘ and a sort of ‘legitimacy’ to the proponents of any current co-operation. For ex-
ample, NORDEFCO builds on the the military synergies between Nordic countries dur-
ing the Cold War, as well as the Nordic passport union and the successful co-operation 
– after the Second World War – on labour migration and cultural exchange. Likewise, 
the nearly century-old alliance between France and the United Kingdom has helped re-
inforce further military co-operation, with each country drawing off its affinities with 
the other.
How might the ‘three islands’ be bridged?
The lessons provided by the ‘three islands’ of co-operation – NORDEFCO, the British-
French alliance and Central European co-operation – are also useful for both current 
and future co-operation. They highlight that there is not a single European country – 
not even the biggest military spenders – that can develop and maintain, any longer, a 
full spectrum of military capabilities. This means that the scarcity of available resources 
will probably press countries to solve their defence budget constrains by abandoning yet 
more capabilities and/or by accelerating additional European military collaboration. 
However, at one and the same time, comprehensive co-operation requires for there to 
be a critical mass of the same or similar capabilities among the co-operating states. 
Without the appropriate level of the same capabilities, governments cannot exploit the 
potential for progressively deeper collaboration. Thus, an over-emphasis on role shar-
ing and the development of niche capabilities by particular states could even hinder co-
operation. Accordingly, and critically, participating states must find a balance between 
abandoning and maintaining capabilities in order to still be able to co-operate across a 
wide spectrum. This mandates better co-ordination among their military planning sys-
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tems and a more effective usage of current structures like the European Defence Agency  
and the Atlantic Alliance’s agencies.12
Lastly, the different needs and capability levels of the ‘three islands’ means that co-
operation will advance in different directions and at different speeds. After all, in many 
ways, Britain and France want at present to share some specific strategic capabilities, 
which are somewhat different to those of the Nordic states or the countries of Central 
Europe (e.g. costly force projection assets). Consequentially, the members of each of the 
‘three islands’ will put different emphasis on their co-operation regarding capability de-
velopment. The European Union and Atlantic Alliance must therefore be used to ensure 
that a common understanding of capability needs can be constituted, while preventing 
– simultaneously – the ‘three islands’ from tacking off into potentially three different 
directions.
Bence Németh works at the Defence Planning Department at the Hungarian 
Ministry of Defence. The views expressed in this ‘Strategic Snapshot’ are his own 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence.
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